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Majoritarian bargaining situations are an integral part of 
modern politics. Coalition research has a long history in 
political science (Axelrod, 1970; Baron and Diermeier, 
2001; de Swann, 1973; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1953), and the seminal Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legisla-
tive bargaining model has been extended to a broad range 
of situations, including spatial bargaining, and bargaining 
over a stochastic surplus or public goods (Eraslan and 
Evdokimov, 2019). Experimental research in the field has 
grown to the extent that Baranski and Morton (2020) were 
able to perform a meta-analysis on the results. However, 
research addressing the social dynamics involved in coali-
tion formation – identity, norms, other-regarding prefer-
ences – is still relatively scarce.
In this study, we used a standard laboratory implementa-
tion of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model, a divide-the-
dollar majority bargaining game where policy is purely 
distributive, to test the impact of social identity on coalition 
partner selection. Our findings showed that ideology has a 
strong effect on who participants ally with. Participants 
offered less and were less likely to offer any positive 
amount to those who were more distant from them ideo-
logically. Substantively, the results provided evidence that 
a preference for similar group members could help predict 
which coalitions will form, even when there are no ideo-
logical benefits to be gained.
Preferences for in-group members could alter partner 
selection in majoritarian bargaining decisions, irrespective of 
the policy outcomes that result. There are some suggestive 
examples in politics. In Germany, the SPD (Social 
Democratic Party) and Die Linke (“The Left”) have broadly 
similar policy preferences but have rarely formed coalitions; 
indeed, the SPD has often preferred the “grand coalition” 
with the conservative CDU (Christian Democratic Union). 
One reason is Die Linke’s history as having formed out of a 
merger between the East-German PDS (Party of Democratic 
Socialism) and the West-German WahlAlternative Soziale 
Gerechtigkeit (WASG) in 2005. The latter was founded by 
Oskar Lafontaine, a former chairman of SPD who fell out 
with the the party, has since campaigned against it and is con-
sidered responsible by some in the SPD for having contrib-
uted to the party’s decline in recent years. Another example 
is the Christian Democrats in Chile, a conservative but anti-
Pinochet party, which in the 2017 general elections opted to 
go alone and lose seats rather than join with other conserva-
tive parties who voted differently in the 1988 plebiscite that 
ousted Pinochet.
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While these examples are suggestive of social identity 
ties, it is hard to measure the effect of social identity using 
observational data, because it is difficult to disentangle the 
“pure effect” of social identity from unobserved prefer-
ences over policy. For example, the SPD’s unwillingness to 
accept Die Linke as a coalition partner could be due to the 
policy distance between the two parties, ideological iden-
tity, or both. To surmount this problem, we used a labora-
tory experiment where participants made a distributive 
proposal (a division of money) to two group members, 
knowing only their gender, race, and political ideology. In 
our setup, group members’ characteristics had no practical 
relevance for payoffs, there were no reputation or monetary 
gains from benefiting one type of person over another, pay-
ing more than the continuation value implied a direct loss to 
personal earnings, and choices were single shot with no 
strategic repercussions. Even so, people offered more 
money to those who were closer to them ideologically.
Of course, students in a lab are not professional politi-
cians, chair(wo)men on a board, or council members. 
However, decades of experimental research suggests that 
assumptions of self-interested rationality are not always 
supported (Thaler, 2015). Individuals, leaders, supporters, 
and grass-roots campaigners can have personal preferences 
(cf. Iyengar et al., 2012; Lehrer, 2012), and these prefer-
ences may affect partner selection in majoritarian bargain-
ing situations, independently of policy consequences. 
Furthermore, even strategic, self-interested political repre-
sentatives may have to take account of the preferences of 
their supporters. Therefore, incorporating social identity 
concerns may help us understand majoritarian bargaining.
Identity theory
According to social identity theory, a person’s membership 
in a group is an important part of their personal identity 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). They 
may then behave more altruistically toward, cooperate with, 
and preferentially associate with, in-group members (Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2010; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; 
Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001), trust less, and discriminate or 
punish out-group members (Charness et al., 2007; 
Chowdhury et al., 2016; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001). 
Political allegiance is itself a form of group identity 
(Campbell et al., 1960; Huddy and Bankert, 2017), and there 
is evidence that out-group hate toward nonpartisans can be 
enhanced by the electoral cycle (Michelitch, 2015: 01).
There are two reasons that identity groups could be congru-
ent with political coalitions. Firstly, if negotiating actors have 
ideological preferences over outputs, then groups may simply 
reflect these preferences (cf. Bandyopadhyay and Oak, 2008; 
Bassi, 2017). For example, in many countries, members of 
political parties have shared ideological positions on the left–
right dimension or share an ethnic group membership. In this 
case, coalition members will have a shared social identity, 
even though social identity plays no causal role in coalition 
formation. Secondly, actors may prefer to have partners who 
are similar to themselves, irrespective of outputs. Coalitions 
are formed by individuals and those they represent, who may 
possess a social identity with a particular group (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000). Thus, coalition formation might be influenced 
by negotiators’ preferences for people similar to themselves, 
or a dislike of those who are different. These preferences could 
explain coalition formation among similar players, even when 
those coalitions are more costly for the proposer in terms of 
concessions. Our experimental design allowed us to identify 
whether social identity had an effect on coalition formation, 
irrespective of a proposer’s preferences over outputs, and thus 
whether identity played a causal role.
Experimental design
Our experiment was based on Baron and Ferejohn (BF; 
1989), where n members of a legislature vote by majority 
rule on proposals to divide a fixed unit of income. In each 
period, one player is randomly selected to make a proposal. 
If a proposal is accepted, the game ends; if it is rejected, the 
“pie” is multiplied by a discount rate δ ≤1, and the game 
continues with a new round of proposals. Each player is 
equally likely to be selected as a proposer.
Previous BF experiments have provided important 
insights on how rules and incentives alter coalition forma-
tion (e.g., Diermeier and Morton, 2005; Drouvelis et al., 
2010; Fréchette et al., 2003: 2; Fréchette et al., 2005). 
Baranski and Morton (2020) analyzed all published BF 
experiments up to 2018 and found that stationary subgame 
perfect equilibrium predictions are not strongly supported 
by experimental evidence, there are roughly 40% all-way 
split proposals in three-member groups, group size and 
impatience have an impact on the prevalence of minimum-
winning coalitions, and the probability of delay increases 
as the penalty for disagreement decreases.
Our implementation followed the standard setup for 
experimental BF games. Experiments started with a short 
questionnaire on demographics and political identity. 
Participants then played 10 rounds of a BF game in three-
person groups, with a pie of GBP 17.00. After that, subjects 
played a one shot three-person dictator game (pie of £3.00), 
as a measure participants’ pro-social orientation. Finally, 
participants filled out a short survey regarding their experi-
ence in the experiment.
In each of the 10 BF periods, subjects were regrouped 
with players from their randomly generated matching group 
of six participants. Therefore, decisions made in one period 
would not affect decisions in the next period, reducing con-
cerns about the (“policy”) outcomes of a participant’s 
offer.1 Each period consisted of up to five rounds. In each 
round, all group members submitted an offer (a division of 
the £17.00). One offer was randomly selected and pre-
sented to all group members, who then voted to accept or 
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reject it. If the offer was accepted, the period ended, and the 
next period began. If the offer was rejected, the next round 
began with the pie discounted by δ = 0.7. If the offer was 
rejected in the fifth round, every player got zero and moved 
on to a new period. Subjects learned the outcome at the end 
of each round. They were paid for the outcome of one ran-
domly selected BF period, plus their earnings from the dic-
tator game and a £2.50 show-up fee.
As a benchmark, we solved the game for a symmetric, 
subgame perfect equilibrium, assuming risk-neutral, self-
interested players. Proposers make a positive offer to 
exactly one other player. We assumed that proposers choose 
the other player at random. Since proposers are also selected 
at random, the expected value of Round t∈{1,2,3,4,5} to 






Players in Round t∈{1,2,3,4} accept any offer equal to or 
greater than a vt t= 1+ . Players in Round 5 accept any positive 
amount, since rejection ends the game with zero payoff. 
Proposers in Round t offer at . Calculating minimum acceptance 
thresholds gives a1 = 3.97, a2 = 2.78, a3 = 1.95, a4 = 1.37, 
a5 = 0.01. First-round offers are accepted in equilibrium.
Experimental treatment
Participants were informed of the gender, race, and ideo-
logical positions of their group members in the BF periods. 
The gender and race of the other participants was displayed 
through an on-screen avatar that matched the data provided 
in the survey. The ideological position of each group mem-
ber was shown on an 11-point left–right scale (Figure 1).
Gender and race represent classic social identity traits 
that affect human behavior (Jenkins, 1996). Ideology, in 
contrast, is a salient identity, which may have lower social 
desirability bias, as people may be less ashamed to dis-
criminate against political outgroups (Fowler and Kam, 
2007; Huddy et al., 2015). Furthermore, by including 
information on all three characteristics, we avoided pre-
senting a single obvious focal point, which could have led 
to demand effects.
Hypotheses
The baseline model predicts that subjects will offer £3.97 to 
one of the group members, offer nothing to the other, and 
keep the rest. However, experimental research suggests we 
should expect a smaller proposer advantage (see Diermeier 
and Morton, 2005; Fréchette et al., 2005). Regarding part-
ner selection, there was no reason to expect any systematic 
pattern, since all players had equal bargaining power and 
were equally “cheap.” This holds for self-interested play-
ers, as well as for any model of social preferences in which 
players care symmetrically about other players’ payoffs.
Conversely, building on social identity literature, we 
argued that social identity affects preferences over coalition 
partners, even if it plays no role in determining payoffs. 
Our design-specific hypotheses were as follows:
H1: The proposer will be more likely to coalesce with an 
in-group than an out-group member. Specifically,
H1a: Offers to same gender or race group members are 
higher than offers made to group members of different 
gender or race.
H1b: Offers to same gender or race group members are 
more likely to be non-zero than offers made to group 
members of different gender or race.
H1c: Offers to other group members are higher when 
the ideological distance between the proposer and 
receiver is smaller.
H1d: Offers to other group members are more likely to be 
non-zero when the ideological distance between the pro-
poser and receiver is smaller.
H2: The receiver of an offer will be more likely to coa-
lesce with an in-group than an out-group proposer. In 
our setup, this would imply that,
H2a: Holding offers constant, group members will be 
more likely to accept offers from a proposer of the same 
gender or race.
H2b: Holding offers constant, group members will be 
more likely to accept offers from proposers who are 
closer to them ideologically.
Figure 1. (a) Avatar set and (b) political self-placement scale presented to the treatment groups.
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Data
All 10 experimental sessions were conducted at the 
University of Essex Social Science Experimental Laboratory 
(ESSEXLab) in December 2014 to February 2015. Each 
session consisted of 18 individuals (details in Online 
Appendix A1). The participants were limited to nationalities 
from stable democracies (identified by Polity IV measures; 
Marshall and Cole, 2014) to ensure a meaningful under-
standing of a left–right ideological scale.
Out of 180 participants, 66% were female (n = 119) and 
69% white (n = 124). All sessions included at least two 
non-white participants and three men, making it difficult to 
know who one was interacting with in the game. Due to the 
small number of participants that were “black,” “Latin 
American,” or “South Asian,” we pooled their races into a 
non-white “others” category for the empirical analysis.2 
Figure 2 plots the distribution of ideological self-place-
ment, as well as the distribution of distances between all 
pairs of participants who interacted with each other.
Empirical analysis
Identification of the causal effect of social identity was 
based on the random assignment and re-matching of groups 
in each of the 10 periods. This eliminated any correlation 
between the social identity characteristics presented in the 
treatment and other factors. The only information provided 
to subjects was the gender, race, and ideological position of 
the other group members. Because participants negotiated 
over multiple periods, we obtained a panel dataset  of the 
subject’s behavior as they interacted with other group 
members with varying characteristics.
To analyze proposal behavior (H1) we looked at partici-
pants’ first-round offers to each group member. Figure 3 
shows the smallest and largest offers made by the proposer 
to the other two group members. As expected given previ-
ous results, there were few offers near the symmetric equi-
librium shown as “SSNE” on the graph. The most frequent 
type of offer was a three-way equal split.3
To test our hypotheses, we analyzed proposer and 
receiver behavior using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
logit models (see Table 1). The unit of analysis was the 
dyadic offer of each proposer to one of the other two group 
members. Our independent variables were “Same Gender 
Prop.–Rec.” and “Same Race Prop.–Rec.” dummies, indi-
cating whether the receiver shared the same characteristics 
with the proposer; and the ideological distance between the 
proposer and receiver, denoted “Diff. Ideology Prop.–Rec.” 
As control variables, we added the gender, race, and ideo-
logical self-placement of the proposer, as well as the simi-
larities between the proposer and the third group member: 
“Diff. Ideology Prop.–3rd,” “Same Gender Prop.–3rd,” and 
“Same Race Prop.–3rd”
Models M1–M3 present linear regressions of the amount 
offered.4 The results were robust to using fixed-effects esti-
mations that accounted for all constant individual-specific 
characteristics.5 In line with H1c, the models showed a 
strong negative effect of ideological distance between pro-
poser and receiver (“Diff. Ideology Prop.–Rec.”) on how 
much money the proposer offered. For every one-point 
increase in ideological distance, proposers offered, on aver-
age, 13 pence less to a receiver, ceteris paribus. M1 shows 
the results without control variables, whereas M2 and M3 
add controls. The strong negative effect of ideological dis-
tance was substantively unaltered.6
Contrary to what we expected (H1a), the coefficients 
for “Same Gender” and “Same Race” were not statisti-
cally significant. One could argue that gender and race 
can only become salient in mixed groups, as in 
Figure 2. Participants’ ideology and ideological distance: (a) distribution of self-placements of participants on the ideological scale 
– 0 meaning extreme left and 10 extreme right (not observed); (b) distribution of absolute differences in self-placement within 
participant dyads.
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Figure 3. Distribution of offers and votes: (a) joint distribution of largest and smallest offer made by the proposer to the other 
two group members. “SSNE” indicates symmetric, subgame perfect equilibrium: offering £3.97 to one group member and nothing 
to the other. (b) Share of first-round offers that were accepted and rejected by a majority of group members. Of all first-round 
proposals, 7.66% were rejected by both other group members – meaning the group went on to Round 2 of the game – slightly 
more than the zero rejections theoretically predicted.
Table 1. Statistical models on proposal and voting behavior: M1–M3 are OLS models regressing the amout offered by a proposer 
to each group member on the difference in ideology between them and the group member receiving the offer as well as dummy 
variables indicating whether both are of the same gender or race. M2 adds comparisons to the third group member not included 
in the offer as control variables and M3 adds proposer characteristics as controls variables. M4 is a logit model regressing a dummy 
variable indicating non-zero offers on the same variables. M5–M6 are logit models regressing a dummy variable indicating whether 
a group member receiving an offer accepted it on the proposer’s and recipient’s characteristics. In short, M1–M4 analyze proposer 
behavior, whereas M5–M6 analyze receiver behavior.
M1 offer M2 offer M3 offer M4 partner M5 vote M6 vote
Diff. Ideology Prop.–Rec. −0.13** −0.16** −0.16** −0.22** −0.15** −0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Same Gender Prop. –Rec. 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.29* −0.02 −0.30
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.28)
Same Race Prop.–Rec. −0.09 −0.14 −0.15 −0.27 0.18 0.20
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19)
Diff. Ideology Prop.–3rd 0.06* 0.06* 0.08  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  
Same Gender Prop.–3rd −0.13 −0.12 0.01  
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.19)  
Same Race Prop.–3rd 0.12 0.10 0.20  
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.22)  
Proposer–Ideology −0.05* −0.04 −0.06 −0.08
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
Proposer–Male −0.01 −0.79** 0.05 −0.08
 (0.11) (0.26) (0.23) (0.37)
Proposer–White 0.06 −0.18 −0.25 −0.17
 (0.08) (0.26) (0.17) (0.33)
Amount offered 1.00***
 (0.12)
Intercept 5.13*** 5.10*** 5.29*** 3.30*** 1.49*** −3.02***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.53) (0.33) (0.75)
Number of observations 3600 3600 3600 3600 1200 1200
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01  
L. R. 37.06 46.69 52.92 105.40 20.60 634.57
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.02 0.58
Note: L.R.: likelihood ratio. All models include matching group clustered standard errors.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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an all-white or all-female group, this element does not 
identify people of other types. However, the non-effects 
of gender and race persisted even when controls for group 
composition were included.7
Model M4 tests subhypotheses H1b and H1d, by looking 
at the probability of offering more than zero to another 
group member, that is, the probability of including the other 
as a coalition partner. Results were similar to the previous 
models. The coefficient on “Same Gender” was positive 
and significant, but this finding was not robust to all model 
specifications (see the Online Appendix).
According to H2, we expected participants that were 
similar to the proposer to be more likely to vote in favor of 
a given offer.8 Figure 3(b) displays the proportion of first-
round offers that were accepted and rejected by a majority 
of group members.
We used logistic regression on the vote of each partici-
pant. Model M5 showed a significant effect of “Diff. 
Ideology Prop.-Rec.” indicating that offers were more 
likely to be rejected by people that were ideologically 
further away from the proposer. However, this was prob-
ably caused by the lower offers made to those people in 
the first place. Once we controlled for the amount offered 
(M6), social identity traits were no longer significant pre-
dictors of voting behavior. Thus, social identity had no 
independent effect on voting behavior, rejecting hypoth-
eses H2a and H2b.
Strategic concerns (e.g., coalition or reputation build-
ing) are unlikely to explain our results, since subjects were 
rematched after every period, and were not aware of the 
size of matching groups. Another possibility is that propos-
ers simply used ideological closeness as a tie-breaking heu-
ristic to select a coalition partner, and were really indifferent 
between the two alternative partners. This seems unlikely.9 
First, gender was an easier cue to use, since in this experi-
mental setting, there were only two alternatives to choose 
from. Second, if subjects were simply using ideological 
distance as a tie-breaker, then we would expect subjects to 
consistently offer the same amount to the ideologically 
closest recipient. In fact, they make higher offers as this 
recipient gets closer to them. Thus, ideological closeness in 
itself appears to matter and not just as a heuristic.
Conclusion
In this paper, we tested for the effect of social identity on 
coalition formation. Our results showed that participants 
systematically favored group members that were closer to 
them ideologically, offering them more and making them 
fewer zero offers. Thus, social identity can create coalitions 
of ideologically like-minded actors, even in the absence of 
a policy dimension. We suggest that this may also occur in 
coalition formation outside the laboratory, either when 
political actors themselves have a social identity, or when 
the social identity of their supporters constrains them.
We found no evidence for in-group bias based on race or 
gender. One reason could be that social desirability reduces the 
effect of these variables. Yet, in some countries, political coali-
tions do form based on ethnicity (Madrid, 2008; Posner, 2004: 
4). Alternatively, the effect of identity could depend on its sali-
ence. Michelitch (2015: 1) presents an example of this in taxi 
fares in Ghana, where only at election time does co-partisan-
ship alter how much drivers are willing to accept for a ride. An 
interesting line of further research would be to conduct similar 
experiments in countries with more salient ethnic identities.
In conclusion, our results imply that coalition forma-
teurs are not necessarily purely rational actors pursuing 
policy goals and/or the benefits of office. Rather, they also 
care about the identity of their partners, preferring others 
who are like themselves. Of course, ideologically con-
nected coalitions may also form due to similar preferences 
over policy. We propose considering the potential impact of 
social identities as a complement to formal theoretical 
work, which could help to predict coalitions.
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1. The experiment was coded using the betr package for R.
2. Empirical analyses using the disaggregated race categories produce 
the same substantive conclusions (Online Appendix Table A6).
3. Forty-nine percent of offers were three-way splits, not far 
off the roughly 40% estimated by Baranski and Morton 
(2020) in a meta-analysis of BF experiments. Behavior 
was similar in the baseline sessions, with no information 
about group members, that we conducted at the same time 
as these treatment sessions. See “Baseline behavior” in the 
Online Appendix.
4. Models include offers and votes for the first negotiation round, 
as these are comparable across groups. Including all rounds did 
not change the conclusions (Online Appendix Table A7).
5. Online Appendix Table A3.
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6. For robustness, we ran analyses at the matching group level 
and found a significant two-tailed Wilcoxon test, p-value 
0.005 significant effect for “Ideo. Dist. Prop.–Rec.” (Online 
Appendix Figure A7). The same occurred for estimations 
with bootstrapped coefficients, to deal with sample selection, 
and a comparison between the first five and last five periods, 
to account for possible learning effects.
7. Online Appendix Table A5.
8. We could only evaluate the results for the proposal that were 
displayed to the group in each round, that is, one in every 
three offers, hence the smaller number of observations. We 
excluded the proposer’s vote from the analysis.
9. In a different variation of the experimental design we used 
the colors green (two participants) and purple (one partici-
pant) to identify group members and measure whether these 
random color allocations served as focal points, with null 
effects. We also conducted baseline sessions where par-
ticipants had no information regarding group members and 
found the random partner selection pattern suggested by ran-
dom assingment.
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